How will navigation through the Strait of Hormuz be addressed? What about the issue of Iran's uranium enrichment? Will Hezbollah in Lebanon be included in the ceasefire agreement?
The United States and Iran will hold talks on the 11th in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Based on their public statements, nearly all core demands between the US and Iran are either opposed or significantly divergent, even crossing each other's 'red lines.' Among these, three key issues have drawn the most attention and are also the most challenging: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's uranium enrichment, and the regional resistance front supported by Iran, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.
How to resolve navigation through the Strait of Hormuz?
Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is at the core of the ceasefire agreement and is also the key to the success or failure of the negotiations.
White House Press Secretary Leavitt stated that U.S. President Trump considers opening the Strait of Hormuz as a 'top priority.' 'Fully, immediately, and safely' opening the Strait of Hormuz is also a prerequisite for Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, however, said that vessel passage must be 'coordinated with Iran's armed forces and consider technical limitations.' On the 9th, Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba issued a written statement saying that the management of the Strait of Hormuz would enter a new phase.
Before the conflict, the Strait of Hormuz was unobstructed, with over 130 ships typically passing through daily. During the conflict, Iran effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz. On the 8th, Araghchi announced that safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz would be achieved within two weeks. However, on the same day, Israel launched its largest air strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon since the outbreak of the war with Iran; in response, Iran once again suspended tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
How to resolve navigation through the Strait of Hormuz? Trump’s stance on this issue changes almost daily. He has suggested that the U.S., rather than Iran, should collect navigation fees for the Strait, then proposed that the U.S. and Iran establish a 'joint mechanism' to collect fees together. On the 9th, he called on Iran to 'better stop' charging. Analysts believe that U.S. military coercion has proven ineffective, and joint international escort missions are difficult to implement. In the negotiations, the U.S. and Iran may link navigation through the Strait with issues such as lifting sanctions. According to some media reports, Iran currently demands a $1 per barrel transit fee from passing oil tankers. The New York Times analysis suggests that the U.S. has consistently upheld freedom of navigation as a fundamental principle, and if the U.S. and Iran were to 'cooperate' on charging, it would violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The biggest question is whether the U.S. will, to some extent, recognize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz? Several think tank experts believe that any level of recognition by the U.S. would enhance Iran's influence on regional and global geopolitics and energy politics, representing a 'strategic failure' for the U.S. and being unacceptable for Gulf nations.
What to do about Iran's uranium enrichment?
Regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment, both sides have drawn their own 'red lines,' with little overlap in their positions.
Trump stated that Iran would hand over its enriched uranium under the ceasefire agreement, and the U.S. and Iran would cooperate to 'deeply investigate' Iran’s uranium stockpile. White House Press Secretary Leavitt stated on the 8th that Iran abandoning uranium enrichment is a 'non-negotiable red line' for Trump. Defense Secretary Hegseth then claimed that if Iran does not hand over its enriched uranium, the U.S. military will take action to 'seize it.'
Iran's position is diametrically opposed to that of the United States: it insists on retaining a certain level of uranium enrichment activities and demands the lifting of relevant restrictions imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
At the onset of the conflict, Trump claimed that the large-scale military strike against Iran was aimed at 'eliminating the imminent threat posed by the Iranian regime,' with the removal of Iran's nuclear capability as the core objective. However, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard stated during a congressional hearing in March that last June’s U.S. bombing destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities, sealing off their entrances, and that Iran has not restarted its nuclear program since then.
Many Middle East experts believe that unless the U.S. deploys ground troops, it would be impossible to seize Iran's deeply buried enriched uranium. Moreover, from an operational standpoint, capturing Iran's enriched uranium poses extremely high technical and military complexity and risk.
Notably, in the current ceasefire negotiations, the U.S. has rarely mentioned limiting Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, which remain Iran’s primary means of retaliation. According to U.S. media reports, Iran’s consistent position is that its missile program is non-negotiable.
Will Hezbollah in Lebanon be included in the ceasefire agreement?
Whether Iran-backed regional resistance fronts, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, can be incorporated into the ceasefire agreement hinges on whether the U.S. can restrain Israel.
When the U.S. and Iran announced the ceasefire, Iranian officials and Pakistan, the mediating party, both stated that Lebanon was part of the ceasefire agreement. However, immediately after the U.S.-Iran ceasefire announcement, Israel launched a large-scale attack on Lebanon. Trump subsequently stated that the ceasefire agreement did not include Lebanon, putting the ceasefire in jeopardy.
On the issue of regional resistance fronts, the U.S. and Iran hold opposing positions. Iran demands an end to attacks on regional armed groups it supports, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and an end to 'continuing the war through Israel.' The U.S., on the other hand, demands that Iran cease supporting these armed organizations. Iran has repeatedly emphasized that Lebanon must be included in the ceasefire agreement. In a written statement, Mojtaba said that Iran views all resistance fronts in the region as a unified whole. Iranian Parliament Speaker Kalibaf stated on the 10th that two conditions must be met before negotiations begin: a ceasefire in Lebanon and the unfreezing of Iran’s frozen assets.
Several U.S. Middle East experts have indicated that Trump wishes to disengage from the conflict with Iran as soon as possible, while the Israeli government hopes to continue fighting to eliminate what it perceives as an 'existential threat.' The interests of the U.S. and Israel are not entirely aligned. Israel’s large-scale bombing of Lebanon immediately after the U.S.-Iran ceasefire may have been intended to sabotage the ceasefire. Unless the U.S. addresses the 'Israel factor,' the U.S.-Iran ceasefire and subsequent negotiations will struggle to remain stable and enduring.
Currently, Israel and Lebanon have agreed to hold their first meeting on the 14th at the U.S. Department of State to discuss the announcement of a ceasefire and the date for initiating negotiations under U.S. auspices. However, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Yechiel Hilik Leight, simultaneously stated that Israel refuses to negotiate a ceasefire with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, believes that 'Israel clearly does not want to agree to a ceasefire,' and the durability of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire depends on whether Trump can restrain Israel.
American analysts also believe that the 'spillover risks' of the Houthi forces in Yemen disrupting shipping in the Red Sea will affect the stability of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire and the negotiation atmosphere.
The U.S.-Iran ceasefire was hastily reached with both sides claiming victory without making substantial concessions. Robert Malley, former White House Special Envoy for Iran, stated that the positions of both parties are vastly different, with significant disagreements, making the negotiation foundation extremely fragile and leaving it difficult to determine what steps should be taken next.
Editor/Jeffy