According to reports, Iran has rejected Oman's proposal to 'equally share the shipping lanes,' demanding that future two-way maritime traffic be partially rerouted through Iranian territorial waters. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated that Iran no longer recognizes the Strait of Hormuz Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968, asserting that Iran requires 'greater control' over shipping to safeguard its national security; mine clearance operations must be conducted solely by Iran and third-party involvement is not permitted.
As negotiations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz continue, Iran has proposed a provisional navigation arrangement that places greater emphasis on its own authority.
On Tuesday, March 28 (Eastern Time), media reports revealed that Iran has demanded that future two-way shipping reroute part of its traffic through Iranian territorial waters. Iran has submitted a provisional arrangement for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz via Oman and explicitly rejected Oman’s proposal for an 'equal division of the shipping lanes,' while also declaring it will no longer recognize the decades-old internationally accepted Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS).
Under this proposal, all inbound vessels would be required to navigate through Iranian waters, and some outbound vessel routes would also be adjusted to pass through Iranian waters, thereby enhancing Iran’s direct control over maritime traffic in the strait.
This proposal not only signals a potential major overhaul of navigation rules in the Strait of Hormuz but also indicates Iran’s attempt to reshape the control structure of this globally critical energy transit corridor by leveraging the post-conflict resumption of shipping.
At the time the news emerged, the Strait of Hormuz had still not returned to its pre-conflict normal navigation status. The internationally recognized TSS became inoperable following the outbreak of hostilities, and vessels are currently relying on temporary routes separately designated by Iran and Oman, with intensive consultations underway among relevant parties to restore commercial shipping.
Iran rejects 'equal division of the shipping lanes' with Oman and announces it will no longer recognize the existing TSS.
Iran’s latest proposal shows clear divergence from the framework previously put forward by Oman.
According to Reuters, Oman had earlier suggested that upon the resumption of navigation, Iran and Oman should equally share management responsibilities for the two-way transit lanes, thereby partially maintaining their longstanding joint oversight model for the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Gharibabadi confirmed that Tehran has formally rejected this proposal.
He stated that Iran requires 'greater control' over shipping to safeguard its national security and therefore insists that portions of both inbound and outbound shipping lanes pass through Iranian waters, rather than adopting a simple equal division of routes.
Gharibabadi simultaneously announced that Iran no longer recognizes the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) for the Strait of Hormuz, which was adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968.
He argued that the long-standing international shipping lane lies largely within Omani waters and can no longer safeguard Iran’s interests under the current security environment. In particular, following the military actions against Iran by the U.S. and Israel in February this year, continuing to adhere to the existing TSS is no longer aligned with reality.
He warned that if Iran’s proposed arrangement is not accepted, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister: Mine clearance must be conducted solely by Iran; third-party involvement is prohibited
In addition to navigation arrangements, Iran has also drawn new 'red lines' regarding subsequent mine-clearance operations in the Strait of Hormuz.
Gharibabadi stated that Iran will not permit any third country to participate in mine-clearance operations in the Strait of Hormuz, even if such operations are invited by Oman.
He said that security in the Strait of Hormuz should be maintained by littoral states themselves, and the involvement of foreign military forces would only further complicate the regional situation.
This statement indicates that even if the international community pushes for joint mine-clearance efforts and the resumption of international shipping in the future, Iran still intends to retain full control over security matters in the strait.
From 'toll rights' to 'control over shipping lanes': Iran seeks strategic initiative
Analysts believe that this interim arrangement concerns not only technical shipping protocols but also reflects Iran’s attempt to reshape the governance framework of the Strait of Hormuz.
Previously, Iran had expressed its desire to establish a new regional management mechanism and sought to impose service fees on transiting vessels; Oman, meanwhile, proposed a model inspired by the Strait of Malacca, under which regional states would jointly manage the waterway and sustain operations through voluntary service contributions rather than mandatory charges.
Iran’s latest demand—to revise shipping lane configurations and reject the existing international Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)—indicates that its objectives now extend beyond mere revenue collection, aiming instead to secure greater institutional influence over critical domains such as route planning, traffic organization, and safety oversight.
For Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz serves both as a national security buffer zone and as a crucial bargaining chip in future negotiations with the United States and Gulf states.
Oman is seeking a compromise, but significant disagreements remain in subsequent negotiations.
In response to Iran’s position, Oman continues its mediation efforts.
According to prior reports, Oman’s proposed new framework has garnered support from several Gulf states, which hope to establish a regionally shared management mechanism that restores commercial shipping while addressing mutual security concerns—and avoids reverting either to the pre-war regime of fully unrestricted navigation or to a system dominated by a single country.
However, the two sides still hold markedly divergent positions on several core issues, including lane demarcation, whether to reinstate the original TSS, whether to permit fees, and who will bear responsibility for future security in the strait.
Analysts note that prior to the conflict, the Strait of Hormuz handled approximately one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments. Any alteration to its shipping regulations could therefore impact the stability of global energy supply chains and the cost structure of international oil and gas trade. Should Iran persist in advancing a new maritime management system and expand its de facto control, the Strait of Hormuz may not only become a focal point of geopolitical competition but also emerge as a new source of institutional risk for global energy transport security.
Editor/Stephen